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Abstract
This paper compares the relative merits of adversarial and inquisitorial sys-
tems of civil procedure in the presence of evidence suppression. Each party has
the incentive to suppress evidence that may damage her case, and to reveal any
evidence that strengthens her case. I model the decision of a litigant to sup-
press evidence. The court conditions its action (transfers between the parties)
upon the evidence which is revealed. Enforcement costs, which are the cost of
suppression and the cost of requesting evidence, are a loss to the relationship
and form the basis for my evaluation of the relative merits of each system. I find
that neither system always outperforms the other. The strength of the inquisi-
torial system is that it allows for randomization over evidence requests, which
leads to lower expected enforcement cost. Litigants cannot commit to random-
ize as they are motivated by the expected award in litigation. The strength
of the adversarial system is that it sometimes allows litigants to utilize their
information about the level of suppression.
In all types of civil litigation, court action is determined by the application of
rules of law to the facts of the case. However, the relevant facts of the case are often
disputed and must be established based upon evidence. Each party has the incentive
to suppress evidence that may damage her case, and to reveal any evidence that
strengthens her case. Discovery of the relevant facts is essential to applying the law to
a dispute. Systems of civil procedure differ primarily in the method by which evidence
concerning the dispute in question is revealed. Under an adversarial regime only the
litigants gather evidence. In an inquisitorial regime the court engages in evidence-
gathering. This paper studies the relative merits of adversarial and inquisitorial fact-
finding systems in a game-theoretic contract framework that specifically considers the
costly option to suppress evidence.1
∗Florida International University. I thank Ian Ayres, Vince Crawford, Rachel Croson, Joel Sobel,
anonymous readers, and seminar participants at UCSD for helpful comments. I especially thank
Joel Watson for many helpful discussions.
1Though I focus on contract, the framework and results also apply to a tort setting.
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An essential role of civil process is to shape individuals’ incentives so as to induce
specific behavior in some primary activity. This is done through the expected loss that
an individual incurs should he deviate from the behavior prescribed by the contract.
This expected loss is comprised of the expected court-compelled transfers resulting
from evidence revealed that shows the deviation, and the cost of any effort on his
part to suppress that evidence. Two crucial components of the method of dispute
resolution are the fact-finding system, and the mapping from evidence that is revealed
to awards. The primary activity considered here is a productive relationship. Player
1 and player 2 can engage in a relationship such that player 2 making an investment is
beneficial, to player 1 and is the jointly optimal outcome. So the players will contract
so as to give player 2 the incentive to make this investment. This will be done by
specifying an up-front payment to player 2 that is intended to compensate him for
the cost of investing, and specifying damages to be paid by player 2 to player 1 if
it is proven that player 2 did not invest. After this productive activity, payoffs are
realized and player 1 may pursue litigation if the investment was not made. If player
2 did not invest, he possesses critical evidence that shows that he did not invest.2
Of course, player 1 would like this evidence to be revealed to the court to show that
player 2 did not invest. Player 2 will wish to suppress this evidence. I assume that
the court is not active and only takes action based on the contract and evidence that
is revealed.
Arguments for or against one system often involve (at least implicitly) some as-
sumption about differences in the ability of each system to address suppression of
evidence. In this simple model the adversarial and inquisitorial systems differ only in
who requests the evidence. It is costly to request the evidence. Under the adversarial
system only player 1 may request the document; under the inquisitorial system only
the court may request the document. In both systems, I assume that both the in-
vestment decision and the level of suppression are observable to the litigants, but not
to the court. I assume that player 2 can suppress evidence equally effectively against
the court or against player 1. Effort by player 2 to suppress is costly. The evidence
is revealed probabilistically when it is requested, and suppression reduces the proba-
bility that the evidence is revealed. I focus on addressing the relative significance of
evidence suppression under these two systems.
The adversarial system has the advantage of litigants being able to utilize infor-
mation about the level of suppression. The strength of the inquisitorial system is
that the court can commit to randomize in its request decision.3 I assess the relative
merits of each regime based upon the cost of inducing the incentive for player 2 to
invest during the productive activity.4 I find that neither regime is always preferred.
The ability of the court to commit to randomize under the inquisitorial regime allows
the evidence to be requested with low probability. This lowers expected enforcement
2I assume, however, that player 1 does not possess any evidence of non-investment.
3The court’s lack of information strengthens its ability to randomize.
4Note that this differs from seeking the truth at any cost.
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costs. Damages are then set more harshly so as to maintain the sufficient incentive
for player 2 to invest.5 That suppression is observable in the adversarial regime is
important when suppression can only occur prior to the request for evidence, as it
allows the adversarial system to implement a larger class of expected punishments.
This occurs when player 2 bears suppression cost prior to player 1’s request decision,
which shapes player 2’s incentive to invest, in order to deter player 1 (who observes
the suppression) from requesting the evidence.
Related Literature
Pretrial discovery is a practical measure that is intended to address differences in
what parties can prove in adversarial systems by allowing each party to ask the other
questions concerning factual matters of the case.6 Each party has the incentive to
attempt to avoid providing evidence in response to a question that is damaging to her
case. This may be done by providing a confusing or elusive response. Examples of this
include failure to fully answer a question, not answering, or even providing much more,
possibly useless, evidence than was requested. The effectiveness of these measures
depends upon both the type and ownership of the evidence in question. It is apparent
that simple, effective methods for preventing these attempts to suppress evidence do
not exist. Brazil (1980) and Shapiro (1979) provide evidence from practicing attorneys
which suggests that the discovery process is ineffective.7
A related form of evidence tampering that typically fits well into this model is
the destruction of evidence. Recent high profile cases have involved the shredding
of documents and other attempts to destroy evidence. As long as the incriminating
evidence that a party attempts to destroy cannot be destroyed with certainty, this
model and results apply. Given the large quantities of documents that were shredded
in the recent Arthur Anderson and Enron case, it’s likely that this effort to destroy
evidence could be effectively modeled as reducing the probability of incriminating ev-
idence being revealed. See Sanchirico (2004) for a thorough treatment of the different
types of evidence tampering. My results concerning randomization of requesting evi-
dence in equilibrium suggest that it may be advantageous not to always have evidence
revealed.
In practice the adversarial system has the advantage of having two parties who
potentially disclose evidence. In most instances the litigants are better informed than
the court. When litigants can disclose similar information, one typically expects the
adversarial system to perform well.8 However, in reality litigants may not be able to
5The intuition here is similar to that found in the optimal enforcement literature.
6In my model I am not concerned with the problem of “over discovery” (the excessive use of
discovery requests for the purpose of imposing unnecessary costs on one’s opponent) as it may be
addressed with fairly easy to administer measures. Cooter and Rubinfeld (1994 and 1995) provide
a thorough treatment and simple measures for its prevention.
7How representative of the population as a whole the data presented in these are is open to
debate. See Sanchirico (2004) for a discussion of this issue with regard to Brazil (1980).
8This is consistent with the finding of Milgrom and Roberts (1986). Bull and Watson (2004)
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convey the same information to the court.9
Proponents of the inquisitorial system often suggest that its strength lies in the
avoidance of the problems of discovery that are inherent in the adversarial system.10
One argument is that since the court is the sole fact-gatherer, it does not rely upon
responses to discovery requests and hence avoids the situation where parties exert
effort to suppress evidence in responses. It is important to note that in most instances
one party typically has some control over each particular piece of evidence. Another
argument in the literature is that having one fact-finder avoids the externality effects
found in the adversarial system. Typically the end result of the civil proceeding is
that the court orders one party to pay the other a transfer. Clearly if increased
expenditure on production of evidence increases one’s chances of winning at trial, it
reduces the probability that one’s opponent will win.11 The marginal value of one
litigant’s expenditure to produce evidence favorable to her case is decreasing in her
opponent’s level of expenditure on evidence production. Thus, proponents of the
inquisitorial regime argue that this externality causes expenditure on the production
of evidence to exceed the socially optimal amount.12
Outline of Paper
The paper is organized as follows. I present the basic model in Section 1. In
Section 2, I study the case where player 2 chooses suppression effort after the request
is made. Then, in Section 3, I analyze the case where suppression occurs prior to the
request decision. In Section 4, I analyze the relative merits of each system on the
basis of my findings and provide a more practical discussion of my results there. The
Appendix contains the proof of Theorem 1.
show this in a theoretical contract framework. Block, Parker, Vyborna, and Dusˇek (2000) find this
in an experimental investigation of legal procedure. Shin (1998) studies a setting where litigants are
equally informed in expectation, but may not be in realization. Froeb and Kobayashi (2000) analyze
a setting where each litigant can incur a cost to draw evidence from the same distribution.
9Bull and Watson (2004) describe the court-imposed transfers that can be implemented under
the adversarial system in a general contract framework. This is in terms of what each party can
prove.
10Gottwald (1999) and Langbein (1985 and 1988) provide descriptions of the German inquisitorial
system, and contrast it with the American system. Allen (1988) and Allen, Ko¨ck, Reichenberg, and
Rosen (1988) discuss the limitations of Langbein’s generalizations.
11Bernardo, Talley, and Welch (2000) analyze legal presumptions in a setting where the cost of
evidence production depends upon the actual state. Sanchirico (2000) models evidence cost as
depending on the actual state.
12Tullock (1980) investigates a setting of this type and finds that an inquisitorial system is prefer-
able. Allen et al. (1988) suggest that in practice it is not clear that parties attempting to reveal as
much evidence as possible is undesirable. Evidence in my model is informative. My model suggests
an advantage for the inquisitorial regime that is somewhat consistent with Tullock’s argument. This
is that the court may be able to commit to not always request the evidence, but the litigants cannot
because player 1 knows whether the investment was made when she makes her request decision and
her incentives differ from those of the court.
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1 A Model of Evidence Suppression
I consider a relationship between two players, who interact over four periods. Prior
to the first period, the legislature determines the fact-finding system. In period 1
the players agree to terms of a contract knowing the legislated system and rules of
court action. This has an externally-enforced component m which specifies monetary
transfers to be compelled by the court in period 4, conditional on evidence revealed
in period 3, and a self-enforced part which describes behavior in the productive in-
teraction and in the fact-finding phase.13
In the second period, productive interaction occurs. Suppose that productive in-
teraction involves player 2 making an investment decision, invest (I) or not (N), which
influences player 1’s immediate payoff in that player 1 prefers I to N .14 Investment is
costly for player 2, and player 1 observes player 2’s investment decision. I denote their
immediate payoffs by u : A→ R2, where A = {I, N}. Assume that these immediate
payoffs are such that the players wish to induce investment. Given this productive
interaction, I assume that the players’ contract specifies some up front transfer from
player 1 to player 2, which is intended to compensate him for his investment, and also
specifies a transfer, given by m, from player 2 to player 1 as damages to be paid if
player 1 does not invest.15 That is, the players write the contract to induce a desired
contingent loss to player 2 that is sufficient to induce investment.
Should player 1 choose to pursue litigation, court enforcement occurs in periods
3 and 4. I assume that player 1 bears a small cost to pursue litigation. Fact-finding
takes place in period 3. The court observes nothing other than some crucial evidence,
possessed by player 2, that may be presented at trial. I represent this crucial evidence
on which the court conditions the transfer by a document d, which exists following N
and does not exist following I. The existence of the document does not ensure that
the court observes it. The document must be revealed. In period 4 the court compels
a transfer between the litigants conditional on d.16
The disclosure of d is considered positive evidence of non-investment since it is
available following N , but not following I. The non-disclosure of d is considered
negative evidence of investment because it is not available following I, but is following
N .17 The court imposes transfer m(d), the damages specified in the contract, when
the document is disclosed, and transferm(∅) when the document is not disclosed. Due
13Though I focus on contract in this paper, the basic set up and results apply to tort as well. In
the case of tort, the legislature decides how the disclosure of the evidence is to influence the action
taken by the court.
14The results are not specific to this particular productive interaction. However, assuming a
specific production game allows me to emphasize the importance of the fact-finding system and
evidence suppression in shaping incentives in productive interaction.
15One can view the contract as specifying liquidated damages for non-investment.
16I assume that players cannot contract on whether they later go to court. The only thing the
court can observe and will condition on is evidence.
17See Bull and Watson (2004) for a more thorough discussion of positive and negative evidence.
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to the possibility of settlement prior to the court’s action transfers must be balanced—
meaning that the amount one player pays must equal what the other receives. That is,
m1(d) = −m2(d), and m1(∅) = −m2(∅). This is because if
∑
i=1,2mi < 0, the players
will renegotiate the contract between periods 3 and 4.18 Define ∆ ≡ m1(d)−m1(∅).19
To prevent the players from going to litigation when player 2 has invested, letm1(∅) =
0. Thus, ∆ represents the damages paid to player 1 by player 2 when the evidence is
disclosed. I assume ∆ > 0.
Given N , in order for d to be revealed it must be requested. which is costly. When
I occurs, d can never be revealed, even if requested, as it does not exist. Following
N , the probability that, when requested, document d is revealed is denoted by p(e),
where e ≥ 0 denotes the level of costly effort by player 2 to suppress d. I assume
p(0) = 1. That is, if both d is requested and player 2 exerts no effort to suppress, d is
revealed. As player 2 exerts costly effort to try to suppress the document, I assume
that p′(e) < 0. I also assume that p′(0) = −∞. Further, I assume that player 2’s
efforts are decreasingly effective, so that p′′(e) > 0. Lastly, assume that p is bounded
below by p > 0. Given these assumptions and N (implying that the document exists);
player 2 will exert, at least in expectation, positive effort to suppress d. I study the
case where player 2’s suppression occurs prior to player 1’s request and the case where
it occurs after player 1’s request. Let φ denote the cost to player 1 (and to the court)
of requesting the evidence.
As modeled, under the adversarial system only player 1 can request evidence.
The court chooses whether to request evidence in the inquisitorial system. I assume
complete information between the players, but assume that the court is uninformed
about the investment decision and player 2’s level of suppression.20
The expected loss imposed upon player 2, when N is selected, is the expected
damages (∆p(e)) plus player 2’s effort to suppress e. I denote player 2’s expected loss
by y. When d is requested and e is exerted in equilibrium, y = ∆p(e) + e. Player
2’s pre-litigation behavior is influenced by the size of y. I denote the enforcement
cost associated with y by c(y), where c(y) is player 2’s effort to suppress e plus the
cost of requesting φ. The timing of when suppression can occur influences the cost of
implementing a specific value of y,which I denote y. The necessary value of y depends
on the specific assumptions about player 2’s cost of investment. I use the enforcement
cost incurred under each system to evaluate the relative merits of each. The notion
is that y is used to motivate player 2 to invest, and it is desirable to motivate him
with the least cost because the enforcement cost is simply a loss to the relationship
18Clearly, transfers cannot be such that
∑
i=1,2mi > 0. In a contract setting, this balancedness
assumption is also motivated by courts being unable to impose fines.
19Note that, given balanced transfers, ∆ = m2(∅)−m2(d).
20This fits with the contract theory literature. In many practical settings this seems reasonable
though I don’t expect complete information between the players to always be the case. However,
these assumptions do emphasize informational differences that are, at least implicitly, assumed in
many previous comparisons of the two systems. I also assume that the court does not observe any
suppression of evidence.
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as a whole.21
2 Suppression After Request
In this section I study how the choice of fact-finding rules influences the cost of
enforcement c when suppression occurs after the request for evidence d. Here, there
are three sub-periods of the fact-finding process. First, given N , the request decision
is made. Second player 2 chooses suppression effort e ≥ 0. Then d is revealed with
probability p(e). If d is requested, player 2 chooses effort e to maximize his expected
payoff. Player 2’s expected payoff is given by −∆p(e) − e, which is his expected
transfer less his cost of suppression. My assumptions ensure an interior solution.
Thus, I focus on player 2’s first order condition. I define e∗ to be effort such that
−∆p′(e∗) = 1. I first analyze the adversarial regime, and then study the inquisitorial
regime.
Adversarial
Player 1 knows whether the investment was made prior to her request decision.
Given N , player 1 requests d when φ < ∆p(e∗). Thus, the adversarial system cannot
implement some range of small values of y because for a small enough expected loss,
player 1 has no incentive to request the document. I state this formally as follows.
Proposition 1 Suppose that suppression occurs only after the request decision and
φ > 0. Then there exist finite values of y that cannot be implemented by the adver-
sarial system.
Proof: Consider y such that 0 < y < φ. Then, since ∆p(e∗) + e∗ = y, it must be that
∆p(e∗) < φ. Thus, player 1 will not request d when a occurs. Q.E.D.
In the first period of interaction the contracting problem facing the players is
min∆ e∗+φ such that ∆p(e∗)+ e∗ = y for the necessary y. When y > 0, this requires
φ < ∆p(e∗). This is solved as follows. The constraint, y = ∆p(e∗(∆)) + e∗(∆), is
monotonic in ∆. So solving the constrained optimization problem just requires finding
the value of ∆ that satisfies the constraint. To see this, note that differentiation of
the constraint yields
dy
d∆ = p(e
∗(∆)) + ∆p′(e∗(∆))[e∗′(∆)] + e∗′(∆).
Since e∗(∆) satisfies player 2’s first order condition, it must be that ∆p′(e∗(∆)) = −1.
Substituting yields
dy
d∆ = p(e
∗(∆))− e∗′(∆) + e∗′(∆) = p(e∗(∆)) > 0.
21In practice most, but not all, disputes are settled before they go to litigation. Though it
would not change the method of analysis, the timing described here could be enriched by including
settlement negotiation and having that negotiation breakdown with some positive probability.
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Thus, y is monotonic in ∆. Next consider the shape of y as a function of ∆. Note
that since ∆ > 0, dy/d∆ ∈ (0, 1). Further, d2y/d∆2 = p′(e∗(∆))e∗′(∆) < 0.
Now consider the relationship between e∗ and ∆. Clearly, e∗ is increasing in ∆.
Total differentiation of the first order condition for player 2, which is ∆p′(e∗)−1 = 0,
yields p′(e∗)d∆+∆p′′(e∗)de∗ = 0. Thus,
de∗
d∆ = −
p′(e∗)
∆p′′(e∗) > 0.
Differentiating again yields
d2e∗
d∆2 = −
p′′(e∗(∆))e∗′(∆)
∆p′′(e∗(∆)) +
p′(e∗(∆))
[∆p′′(e∗(∆))]2 [p
′′(e∗(∆)) + ∆p′′′(e∗(∆))e∗′(∆)].
So, although, e∗ is monotonic in ∆, the curvature is not generally clear. If p′′′(e) > 0,
the graph will be strictly concave. However, monotonicity is the important feature.
As the relationship between y and ∆ is monotonically increasing, the graph of
e∗ as a function of y will be monotonically increasing. So c = e∗(∆) + φ is also
monotonic. However, to describe c = e∗(∆) + φ as a function of y, we must consider
the request decision. Player 1 will not request the evidence when φ < ∆p(e∗(∆)).
This corresponds to when the value of c is above the 45-degree line in Figure 1 below
since a comparison of c = e∗(∆) + φ and y = ∆p(e∗(∆)) + e∗(∆) is equivalent to a
comparison of φ and ∆p(e∗(∆)). A dotted line in Figure 1 below indicates values of
y for which the request is not made.
Since p is bounded we know that for a large enough value of ∆ it will be the case
that φ/∆ < p(e∗(∆)), meaning the request will be made. The graph in Figure 1
is based on an e∗ that is strictly concave in ∆. If e∗(∆) is not strictly concave, c
may move above and below the 45-degree line, but must eventually fall below it and
remain below it. Clearly, a larger y than is needed will induce the desired incentives
in the productive interaction.22 However, this results in a higher enforcement cost.
Inquisitorial
The timing here is as above, but the court, instead of player 1, requests d. As
discussed above, the court must condition the transfer imposed upon whether d is
revealed. Since the court is not motivated by the transfer, it can randomize as
to when it requests d. Denote the probability with which the court requests d by
α ∈ [0, 1]. I assume that when ∆p(e∗) < φ, α must equal zero.23 I now consider
how α influences the relationship between expected litigation costs and the expected
22If player 2’s immediate payoff from investing has a stochastic component, setting y very large
would deter efficient breach of the contract. Further, there may be institutional constraints on the
size of ∆ relative to the actual difference in player 1’s immediate payoff.
23That is, I assume that the court does not request when the expected gain to doing so is less
than the cost of requesting. This assumption does not have a qualitative impact on the comparison
of systems.
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Figure 1: Adversarial, effort after – Relationship between c and y.
difference in transfers. For φ < ∆p(e∗), the expected y = α∆p(e∗) + αe∗, and the
expected c = αe∗ + αφ. Note that, by themselves the players cannot commit to
randomize as player 1 knows whether the evidence exits when she decides whether to
request the document, and has the incentive to always request document d when it
exists.24 However, here α is selected as a policy decision, and then the players select
∆ with knowledge of α. Recall that p is bounded below by p > 0. For a given y, as
α approaches zero (and ∆ is increased) y can be implemented in expectation at no
cost. I state this formally as follows.
Theorem 1 Consider an inquisitorial system in which suppression only occurs after
the request for document d. Suppose that p > 0. Then, when d is requested with
probability α, for an arbitrarily small α any expected y can be implemented at zero
expected cost.
Effort e∗ and the request cost φ are incurred with low probability. Thus, expected
cost is low. ∆ is set very large so that even though it is paid with low probability
it provides the correct incentives in expectation. Since p is bounded from below e is
bounded from above. Thus, the expected cost of effort approaches zero as α becomes
small and the probability that e is actually incurred approaches zero.25 It is crucial
that p > 0, so player 2 cannot drive the expected transfer to zero. This implies the
existence of a ∆ that is large enough to give the desired y.26 Note that ∆ will be
24Certainly there are ways to attempt to lessen this effect under the adversarial system. Decoupling
is one way to do this. See Polinsky and Che (1991). However, it is not clear that decoupled contracts
of that nature typically enforced by courts. These are perhaps more readily enforced by other
enforcement authorities. Bernstein (1992) discusses a diamond trade group that enforces transfers
to third parties.
25Thus, a graph of expected cost as a function of expected punishment (similar to that found in
Figure 1) would simply be a horizontal line.
26Values of y close to zero can be implemented by choosing α close to zero and ∆ such that
∆p(e∗) > φ so that α∆p(e∗) = y.
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larger under the randomization scheme than in the adversarial case where player 1,
so this result relies upon ∆ having a rather punitive nature. I discuss this in more
detail in Section 4.
The intuition is familiar from the literature on public enforcement of law. There
the notion is that it is costly to provide government enforcement of law, so it may
be advantageous to put less effort into catching criminals, but to punish (by means
of a fine) those who are caught more harshly. This induces the desired incentive
for potential criminals as the expected fine is the same. However, enforcement costs
are reduced. The uncertainty that allows for randomization is the result of effort to
catch violators. The classic treatment is Becker (1968). Polinsky and Shavell (2000)
provide a good survey of the literature. The uncertainty for my result comes jointly
from court randomization and uncertainty of document revelation.
Given y and φ, the design problem in period 1 is to choose ∆ (chosen by the play-
ers) and α (chosen prior to the players contracting by the legislature) to implement
y at minimum enforcement costs. Formally, this problem is min∆,α αe∗ + αφ such
that α∆p(e∗) + αe∗ = y. From Theorem 1 choosing α close to zero and ∆ such that
φ < ∆p(e∗) and α∆p(e∗) = y will minimize αe∗ + αφ while yielding α∆p(e∗) = y.
3 Suppression Before Request
Here I analyze the case where suppression can occur only between the initiation
of litigation and the request decision.27 I assume that player 2 chooses the level
of suppression effort, which is observable to player 1 and is not observable to the
court, before the request decision is made. Player 2’s effort to suppress is assumed to
influence the probability that the document is revealed in the same manner as before.
Adversarial
Since player 1 observes player 2’s effort to suppress prior to her request decision,
player 1 will request d only when φ < ∆p(e), for the e player 2 actually exerts. Let
e denote e such that φ = ∆p(e). Player 2 chooses e to maximize his enforcement
payoff, which may involve exerting e to prevent player 1 from requesting.
Proposition 2 Consider the adversarial system following N . Suppose φ < ∆, and
player 2 can only suppress prior to litigation. Then, prior to player 1’s request deci-
sion player 2 exerts e when e < ∆p(e∗) + e∗ and exerts e∗ otherwise.
Proof: This just follows from player 2’s payoff and player 1’s request rule. When
e < ∆p(e∗)+ e∗, player 2’s payoff from exerting e (and deterring player 1’s request) is
27Though I consider that settlement may occur between when the document is potentially revealed
and when the court imposes transfers, I do not study renegotiation prior to that. So I am not
concerned with the scope for renegotiation prior to litigation. That is, I assume for reasons not
modeled that settlement does not occur prior to litigation.
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Figure 2: Adversarial, effort before – Relationship between y and ∆.
greater than when he exerts e∗ and player 1 requests. However, when ∆p(e∗)+e∗ ≤ e,
he prefers to exert e∗ and let player 1 request. Q.E.D.
This is just like entry deterrence—when the request-deterring level of suppression
e is less than the expected loss under e∗, player 2 suppresses at e. Player 2’s behavior
here differs from the case where effort is exerted after player 1 requests as he exerts
effort to suppress when ∆ > φ > ∆p(e∗).28
To consider the period 1 design problem, let’s consider the relationship between
y and ∆ in the case where the request is deterred and in the case where the request
is made.29 For the case where the request is deterred, since e is defined to be effort
such that φ = ∆p(e), p′(·) < 0, and p′′(·) > 0, it must be that dy/d∆ > 0 and
d2y/d∆2 > 0. Thus, the relationship between y and ∆, given that the request is
deterred, is as represented in Figure 2.
In the case where the request is made (holding aside, for now, player 1’s decision
of whether to request), the relationship between y and ∆ is as described on page 2.
That is, when the request is always made, dy/d∆ ∈ (0, 1) and d2y/d∆2 < 0. This is
also represented in Figure 2.
Given the nature of the relationship between y and ∆ under each of these settings,
the curves cross at most once. Thus, there is a crucial value of ∆, say ∆∗, such that
for values of ∆ below (above) ∆∗ player 2 deters (allows) the request. So the design
problem is simply to choose the unique value of ∆ for the specific y that is to be
implemented. Note that arbitrarily small values of y can be implemented.
28When φ ≥ ∆ player 1 will not request d regardless of player 2’s effort.
29I thank an anonymous reader for suggesting this type of presentation. I am also grateful to that
same reader for pointing out an error in an earlier version.
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Figure 3: Adversarial, effort before – Relationship between c and y.
Proposition 3 Consider the adversarial system where player 2 can only exert effort
to suppress prior to the request decision and this effort is observable by player 1. Then
y arbitrarily close to zero can be implemented.
Proof: Given y, choose ∆ according to the procedure described in the construction
of Figure 2. Q.E.D.
The relationship between c and y is represented in Figure 3. For y close to zero the
slope is 1 as y = e = c. For larger values of y, the slope is less than 1 as φ < ∆p(e∗).
Inquisitorial
I now consider the inquisitorial system. Recall that the court is assumed to be
unable to observe suppression effort. As above, the court can commit to request d
with probability α. Let z = α∆. From above, there is a unique value of z that
implements a particular expected punishment y. Thus, the implementation problem,
given y and the corresponding z that implements y, is to choose α and ∆, such that
α∆ = z, to minimize the expected cost of implementing a given y. Setting α very
small reduces the expected request cost. However, since player 2 exerts effort to
suppress before knowing whether to the request is made (and chooses his effort e∗ in
response to z), there is no reduction in effort to suppress as in Section 2.
Proposition 4 Consider the inquisitorial system when suppression can only occur
prior to the request decision. Take as given y, and α˜ arbitrarily close to zero. Suppose
there exists ∆˜ such that φ < ∆˜p(e˜) and α˜∆˜p(e˜) + e˜ = y, where e˜ is such that
−α˜∆p′(e˜) = 1. Then α˜ and ∆˜ implement y at expected cost e˜. Further, the minimum
expected cost at which y can be implemented is e˜.
As noted above, when a given value of y can be implemented under both the
adversarial and inquisitorial systems, it must be that ∆ under the adversarial system
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Figure 4: Inquisitorial regime, effort before – Relationship between expected c and
expected y.
is equal to z under the inquisitorial system. This is because there is a unique value
of ∆ (z, with randomization) that implements a given y. So both induce the same
level of effort.
Proposition 5 Consider the case where effort to suppress can only be exerted prior
to the request decision. Take as given y. Suppose that y can be implemented under
the adversarial regime and suppression effort e∗ is induced. Further, suppose that y
can be implemented under the inquisitorial regime and suppression effort e˜ is induced.
Then it must be that e∗ = e˜.
Proof: Suppose not. Then due to the strict convexity of p it must be that either e∗
or e˜ is not optimal. Q.E.D.
Thus, for y’s that can be implemented by both systems, randomization gives
the inquisitorial system an expected cost advantage of φ. The relationship between
expected c and y is represented in Figure 4. As above, I require that the expected
transfer justify the request cost (φ < ∆˜p(e˜)), for the court to request the evidence.30
Unlike in the case where suppression occurs after the request, suppression effort is
always exerted and there will be some values of y that the inquisitorial system cannot
implement.
4 A More Direct Comparison
In this Section I directly compare the relative merits of each system. I define µ to
be operating costs of the inquisitorial system less those of the adversarial system. I
30Here again, a large value of y can be used to induce the desired incentives in the productive
phase, but it requires a higher level of enforcement cost and may hinder efficient breach.
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Figure 5: Relationship between expected c and expected y when µ = 0.
consider the case where the request cost for each party is zero. Note that with no
request cost, the adversarial system, for effort occuring before or after the request,
and the inquisitorial system, when effort occurs prior to litigation, involve essentially
the same design problem.
I first consider the case where the operating cost of each system is the same
(µ = 0). This is represented in Figure 5. The inquisitorial system is preferred when
effort occurs after the request decision.31 When suppression only occurs prior to the
request decision, the two systems face essentially the same problem since the request
cost is zero.
I now consider a perhaps more realistic case where the cost of operating the
inquisitorial system is higher than that of operating the adversarial system (µ > 0).
Some have argued that in practice operating costs of inquisitorial systems may be
higher than those of adversarial systems. One reason is that judges must spend time
becoming familiar with cases. It is likely that a judge who is unfamiliar with the
issues of a case would require preparation in order to be able to request evidence.
When the court conducts fact-finding, it is reasonable to expect that more time may
be spent in court. In practice there are many more judges in inquisitorial systems
than in adversarial systems.32
This case is represented in Figure 6. When suppression occurs before, the adver-
sarial system is strictly preferred as the same outcome can by implemented at a lower
cost. When suppression occurs after, the benefits of the inquisitorial system must be
balanced against the cost of its implementation. This implies comparing the size of
the gain from the inquisitorial system with the size of µ. Consider the case where
suppression occurs after the request decision. For y below yc the adversarial system is
31That is, it is preferred on the basis of cost associated with implementing a given y.
32Proponents of the inquisitorial system may suggest that attorney fees are lower under the in-
quisitorial system.
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Figure 6: Relationship between expected c and expected y when µ > 0.
preferred. When y > yc, the inquisitorial system is preferred. That is, for large values
of y the inquisitorial system implements y at a lower expected cost. More formally,
this is as follows.
Observation 1 Suppose φ = 0, and µ > 0. Assume suppression only occurs after
the request decision. Then under the adversarial regime any y < yc can be imple-
mented at a lower cost than it can be under the inquisitorial regime. However, under
the inquisitorial regime any y > yc can be implemented at lower cost than it can be
under the adversarial regime.
When suppression only occurs prior to litigation, the adversarial system performs
better.
Observation 2 Suppose φ = 0, and µ > 0. Assume suppression only occurs prior to
the request decision. Then under the adversarial regime any (finite and positive)
y can be implemented at lower cost than under the inquisitorial regime.
The strength of the inquisitorial regime lies in its ability to commit to randomize.
However, this randomization requires a large ∆. Thus the actual damages imposed
must be very punitive. I have been concerned with choosing y to prevent player 2
from deviating to N . Thus, in a sense, I am concerned with restitution damages as I
am basing y on player 2’s gain from deviating.33 However, the actual award that is
received in court is ∆. I describe punitive damages as follows.
Definition 1 ∆ has a punitive component if ∆ > y.
33In many settings it is likely that the gain by player 2 may actually be less than the loss imposed
on player 1. Here it is reasonable that this is the case as having positive surplus requires that player
2’s cost of investment be less than the gain in player 1’s immediate payoff.
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When suppression is possible ∆ must have a punitive component, regardless of the
system.
Proposition 6 Given that y > 0, ∆ must have a punitive component.
Proof: Consider first the case where φ < ∆p(e∗), where e∗ is such that −∆p′(e∗) = 1.
Since e∗ yields an interior solution it must be that ∆ > ∆p(e∗) + e∗. Next, consider
the case for small y’s under the adversarial system when suppression only occurs prior
to litigation. When player 2 exerts e it must be that y = e < ∆p(e∗) + e∗. Q.E.D.
Player 2 will suppress evidence when it is worthwhile for him to do so. This
implies that, when evidence is requested only probabilistically, the difference in actual
transfers must have a punitive component.
Clearly, the randomization result requires a relatively large ∆. In order for the
court to randomize, ∆ must have a much larger punitive component than the ∆
under the adversarial system. Concerns about fairness may, institutionally, limit the
usefulness of the inquisitorial system as a way to commit to randomization.34 If the
state expresses a policy where the actual transfer should fit the offense, then ∆ cannot,
in general, be large enough for randomization to realize the efficiency gains. However,
it is worth noting that the actual transfer ∆ may only have a punitive component
based upon restitution damages. In reality it may be that expectations damages
would be much larger.35 Under expectations damages player 1 is awarded the amount
needed to give her what she expected to receive if player 2 had acted according to
the contract. See, for example, Barnett (1999) for a discussion of contract damages.
An explanation of Theorem 1 is that if the court is uninformed of the state of
the world, it can commit to randomizing as to whether to request. It may be, in
reality, that there are many possible mutually exclusive documents that could exist.
If this is the case, the court may very well not know which document to request. The
inquisitorial system may in practice allow some scope for randomization. For example,
though randomization is not their focus, Allen et al. (1988) discuss a case in Germany
where the judge appears to disregard evidence and shape witness testimony to fit a
stronger position than that the witness actually takes. They discuss the numerous
privileges that witnesses in Germany may claim. Additionally, they suggest that
many types of written documents are very difficult to introduce into evidence.
In practice many Civil law countries have been more willing to enforce penalty
clauses in contract law. Hatzis (2003) deals more generally with this difference be-
tween Civil and Common contract law, and argues that enforcement of penalty clauses
is one of the few areas where there is a substantive difference between the two. Hatzis’
discussion of the laws of specific Civil law countries suggests that penalty clauses are
34Further, wealth constraints may also pose a problem. The large literature on optimal enforce-
ment that has dealt with these issues is quite relevant.
35This has not been specifically addressed in the productive activity modeled here, and in general
there is not a clear relationship between the gain to player 2 from choosing N and the associated
loss to player 1.
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most likely to be enforced when the contract is a commercial contract between busi-
nessmen. Certainly, there are many limitations. However, it seems that Civil law
countries are much more willing to enforce penalty clauses, and this is, at least to
some extent, consistent with Theorem 1.
Limitations on punitive damages may restrict the size of ∆ for a given y. In
my model, an analogous constraint would be a limitation on the size of α. If α is
constrained to be 1, the effect is the same as when the size of ∆ is constrained relative
to y. Another explanation as to why α may be constrained is that in practice certain
inquisitorial systems allow litigants to suggest which documents the court should
attempt to gather. Allen et al. (1988) and Langbein (1985) discuss the possibility
and tendency of this in German civil procedure.
So I now explore the effects of the constraint that α = 1. When α = 1 the court
must always request d. Recall that player 1 will not choose to go to court unless N
has occured, but the court cannot condition upon that.36 Consider as above the case
where φ = 0. When µ = 0 either system has the same cost for a given y. When µ > 0
the adversarial system is preferred.
Observation 3 Suppose φ = 0 and α = 1. Then when µ > 0 a given y is im-
plemented at a lower cost under the adversarial regime than under the inquisitorial
regime. When µ = 0 either regime will implement a given y at the same cost.
5 Conclusion
I have compared the relative merits of systems of fact-finding in a model that allows
for the suppression of evidence. Neither system dominates the other. The inquisitorial
system’s strength is its ability to commit to randomize—my model suggests that it
is better for evidence not to always be requested. This is very much at odds with the
literature in favor of either system. I stress the importance of the litigation process
in influencing players’ incentives in primary activity as opposed to simply focusing
on searching for the truth.
Many advocates of the adversarial system have suggested that the litigants are
better informed and imply that thus the adversarial system is preferred. Here, player 1
cannot commit to randomize under the adversarial system because she knows whether
the document exists and the level of suppression, and she is motivated by the transfer.
In some sense, this is consistent with most of the proponents of the inquisitorial system
who have suggested that the inquisitorial system is preferred because litigants act in
their own self interest. However, for some (small) values of y when φ > 0, a benefit
of the adversarial regime is that the players can observe suppression.
Certainly, the specific features of each actual system are of great importance, and
will influence whether randomization has any advantage. As such, there are many
36Otherwise, player 1 would initiate litigation even when player 2 invests.
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limitations to Theorem 1, and I do not expect it to hold generally in practice. It
may be that a player can completely suppress evidence (that is, p = 0) and the result
may not hold. For example, if a party can shred documents and knows for certain
that he is shredding the “smoking gun” document, this may restrict the usefulness
of randomization.37 For a large enough value of µ, the adversarial system may be
preferred.
Though not modeled here, the choice of system may influence the functional form
of p. Under one system suppression may be less effective than under another. A
reasonable assumption is that litigants are in a better position to detect suppression.
However, the court is in a better position to do something about it. That is, a litigant
may more easily realize that her opponent is acting to suppress evidence, but in order
for the court to act she must convince the court that her opponent is suppressing
evidence. In certain circumstances, a litigant may have the incentive to suggest that
her opponent is suppressing when in fact he is not. Avenues for future research include
evaluating these issues in a more general model with many documents and/or in a
setting of asymmetric information.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1: Let y denote the desired expected loss to player 2. y ≡
∆p(e∗)+e∗ ≡ α∆ˆp(eˆ)+eˆ, where ∆ and ∆ˆ denote the differences in the actual transfers
and e∗ and eˆ denote the equilibrium levels of effort under the case where player 1
requests the document that exists and the randomization scheme respectively. Define
x ≡ α∆(α)p(e(∆(α))) and rearrange to obtain x/α∆(α) = p(e(∆(α))). Inverting
yields p−1(y/α∆(α)) = e(∆(α)). To simplify notation let q(·) ≡ p−1(·).
I want to show that the expected enforcement cost, αeˆ + αφ under the inquisi-
torial system approaches zero when α approaches 0. To do this I show that for
a small enough α the optimal e approaches an upper bound. This implies that
αe approaches zero. To do this, I need to find e′′(α). From above, de/dα =
q′(y/α∆(α))[p(e(∆(α)))/α + y∆′(α)/α[∆(α)]2] It is apparent that de/dα < 0. Dif-
ferentiating again to find the second derivative yields
d2e/dα2 = −q′′(y/α∆(α))[p(e(∆(α)))/α + y∆′(α)/α[∆(α)]2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
−q′(y/α∆(α))︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
[p′(e(∆(α)))e′(∆(α))∆′(α)/α︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
+ y∆′′(α)/α[∆(α)]2︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
−y∆′(α)[(∆(α))2 + α∆′(α)]/α2[∆(α)]4︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
d2e/dα2 < 0.
Thus, e is decreasing and concave in α. This implies that e is bounded from above,
and as α approaches 0, e approaches this bound. Thus, the expected enforcement
37In general, this does not seem to be the case for the document shredders that have been made
popular in recent cases. These parties had enormously large quantities of documents. Surely all of
the documents shredded were not crucial ones.
18
costs approach zero.
Note that for values of y close to zero, y can be implemented by choosing α close
to zero and ∆ such that ∆p(e∗) > φ so that α∆p(e∗) = y. Further, for y < 0 the
court chooses α close to zero so as to make αφ close to zero, and then chooses ∆ so
that α∆ = y. This is because player 2 will not suppress when ∆ < 0. Q.E.D.
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